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SACRILEGE AS AN ARCHETYPAL CRIME: BETWEEN LAW AND RELIGION IN 






Hor. sat. 1.3.115-117: 
nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque  
qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti 
et qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit.  
 
The passage forms part of an exquisitely philosophical piece of argumentation. Horace 
discusses the theme of whether the law should be applied in a rigid, undifferentiated way – 
irrespective of the scale, motive and context of the offence – or whether culpability should be 
evaluated case by case, considering the real gravity of the deed, on the basis of reason, good 
sense and of social utility itself (vv. 76-98). 
More specifically, the poet, after a long disquisition on the vitia of others and the need to 
pardon them (vv. 20-75)
1
 – according to the principle that nemo sine vitiis nascitur (v. 68) –, 
arrives at the conclusion that distinctions must be made between human wrongdoings.
2
 This is at 
odds with the line taken by the Stoics, who, by contrast, admitted no differentiation between 
misdeeds, applying the same identical severity to them all.
3
 In the lines being considered, Horace 
– with an example that leaves no room for ambiguity – makes it clear that reason will never 
prove that the sin is one and the same to cut young cabbages in a neighbour’s garden and to steal 
by night the sacred emblems of the gods: the difference between the two acts is glaring, and is 
specifically intended, in Horace’s argument, to underline that not all deplorable actions should be 
punished to the same degree. 
 
 
1. Qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti 
 
 
                                                          
* The present article is an expanded and updated version of a lecture delivered in the Department of Classics at Tel 
Aviv University (17.06.2013), subsequently incorporated into my book La Poesia e il Diritto in Orazio. Tra autore 
e pubblico (Naples 2014), to which the reader is referred for the context of Horace’s work (see also note 4 below). 
** Post doctoral fellow at Tel Aviv University, the Buchmann Faculty of Law.  
1
 The poet observes that people’s defects – especially in matters of friendship and love, that is, bonds distinguished 
by reciprocal esteem and trust, and thus founded on fides – should be judged with indulgence. He shows, however, 
that men behave quite differently, emphasizing the faults of others. 
2
 P. Fedeli, Orazio, Tutte le Opere, Turin 2009, 821, observes that Horace’s thinking on the question was influenced 
by an underlying Epicureanism. 
3
 As is known, the Stoics, besides placing all sins on the same level, believed that the animus peccantis and not the 
rei quantitas should be considered. 
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The misdeeds indicated by Horace, although they seem merely to be cited as examples, do 
however refer to quite precise legal offences.
4
 
Following the order in which they are mentioned by the poet, let’s first of all consider the 
case of someone who teneros caules alieni fregerit horti. 
It is worth noting that the passage in question had not received the attention of Roman legal 
scholarship until a recent analysis by Diliberto. An attempt will therefore be made here to 
highlight the most significant points he makes.
5
 
Above all, Diliberto stresses that Trebatius Testa (who, as we know, was a friend of Horace)
6
 
took an interest ex professo in this juridical theme;
7
 Trebatius took part, in fact, in the animated 
jurisprudential discussion concerning which actio could be used in the event of someone tearing 
up plants from another person’s land – the decemviral actio or the one ex lege Aquilia. The 
reference to the jurist regarding actions for such an offence is rendered explicit in D. 47.7.1 
(Paul., 9 ad Sab). According to Diliberto, the singularity of Horace’s mention of the cutting of 
young cabbages in another person’s garden suggests some further considerations.
8
 In the first 
place, the scholar notes that the actio utilizable in the case of the cutting down of someone else’s 
trees was certainly of decemviral origin. Indeed, Gaius himself (4.11), in a celebrated passage in 
the Institutions, in order to demonstrate the rigidity of the ancient legis actiones and of the 
obligation to pronounce certa verba, did so through the offence de arboribus succisis.
9
 Secondly, 
                                                          
4
 As I pointed out in my book Hassan, La poesia e il diritto in Orazio cit. 63ff., in Horace’s poetry there is a 
surprisingly recurrent use of legal terms and imagery, with many references to law, including various norms of the 
Twelve Tables, lex Aquilia (sat. 1.3.115-117), the treasure trove (sat. 2.6.1-13), latent defects (sat. 1.2.83-92, 
2.3.281-286, epist. 2.2.1-20). Often amusing, sophisticated and technically precise, they are aimed at readers with 
different levels of education: from the most elementary to that of jurists in the strict sense of the term. Horace’s 
literary texts can therefore be understood variously, according to readers’ cultural background, amicitiae and 
interests. The use of legal references is particularly evident in the Satires, where they have an ironic and/or parodic 
function designed to make readers laugh. Knowledge of law in the Rome of the first century BC seems not to have 
been the exclusive preserve of specialists, but to have necessarily extended to include educated intellectual circles. 
The juridical tradition, and in some cases, the law in force, appear to have been a characteristic part of the Romans’ 
heritage, a literary – but also cultural, in a broad, social sense – whole, and acquired a role as a tool for poetic ends: 
law served poetry and, at the same time, was an essential part of a narrative of the Roman society of that time.  
5
 See O. Diliberto, La satira e il diritto: una nuova lettura di Horat., sat. 1.3.115-117, in AUPA 55 (2012) 395ff.  
6
 On the friendship between Horace and Trebatius Testa see Hassan, La poesia e il diritto in Orazio cit., 25-32 and 
bibliographic references cited therein. See, finally, G. Lariccia, Caio Trabazio Testa – Profilo di un giurista dell’età 
di ‘mezzo’ tra Repubblica e Principato in Iura & Legal Systems 2 (2015) 51.  
7
 In all probability, Trebatius Testa also dealt with the theme of sacrilege: see D. 10.3.6.6 (Ulp., 19 ad ed.); Arnob. 
adv. nat. 7.31; Gell. noct. Att. 7.12.5; Macr. sat. 1.16.28; 3.3.2-5; 3.5.1; 3.7.5-8; Serv. Aen 11.316. For more on this, 
see Diliberto, La satira e il diritto cit., 396. 
8
 Diliberto, La satira e il diritto cit., 396ff. 
9
 Gai. 4.11: Unde eum, qui de vitibus succisis ita egisset, ut in actione vites nominaret, responsum est rem 
perdidisse, cum debuisset arbores nominare eo, quod lex XII tabularum, ex qua de vitibus succisis actio competeret, 
generaliter de arboribus succisis loqueretur, on which, most recently, see Diliberto, La satira e il diritto cit., 397f., 
who examines, in this regard, D. 47.7.2 (Gai., 1 ad leg. XII tab.) and D. 47.7.4 (Gai., 1 ad leg. XII tab.). Diliberto 
then goes on to consider D. 47.7.3 pr.-8 (Ulp., 42 ad Sab.), where Ulpian on the one hand holds forth in great detail 
about which plants can be associated with the notion of arbor, specifically mentioning the plerique veterum who 
sustained that vines were definitely encompassed by the notion of arbor, and on the other, recalls that other 
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Diliberto points out that Labeo and Trebatius (who debated the notion of arbor in order to 
understand whether the cutting down of bushes came under the cited actio or not) also discussed 
the relationship between the decemviral action and the ex lege Aquilia one, as can be read in 
 
D. 47.7.1 (Paul., 9 ad Sab): 
Si furtim arbores caesae sint, ex lege Aquilia et ex duodecim tabularum dandam actionem 
Labeo ait: sed Trebatius ita utramque dandam, ut iudex in posteriore deducat id quod ex prima 




The direct involvement of Trebatius in the debate places the jurisprudential controversy 
precisely to the time of Horace. 
Finally, Diliberto also argues that “the expression used in the passage is singularly, […] 




D. 9.2.27.5 (Ulp., 18 ad ed.): 
Tertio autem capite ait eadem lex Aquilia: «Ceterarum rerum praeter nomine et pecudem 
occisos si quis alteri damnum faxit, quod usserit fregerit ruperit iniuria, quanti ea res erit in 
diebus triginta proximis, tantum aes domino dare damnas esto» 
 
Here the expression used to indicate one of the different crimes for which provision is made 
in the lex regarding wrongful damage (quis ... fregerit) virtually coincides with what can be read 
in Horace (qui … fregerit). Diliberto observes that Horace seems to propose in a parodic key, and 
with technical legal precision, the solution to an old problem. The poet appears to wish to show 
that cutting cabbages could not be regarded as the cutting of arbores in the narrow sense, but 
rather that it was just actio ex lege Aquilia, precisely because the young cabbages did not come 
under the notion of arbor. 
The reference in sat. 1.3.116 thus evokes a specific legal offence, consciously chosen by 
Horace for its peculiarity and the associated jurisprudential diatribe, in order to compare it with a 
another legal offence, the punishment for which was much more serious: sacrilegium. The 
purpose was to show that crimes could not all be placed on the same plane,
12
 as stated at the 
beginning. 
But this literary game could only have been understood by a restricted circle of readers 
conscious of the juridical implications of the text, and therefore able to grasp its irony
13
.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
participants in the debate were Pomponius (in the nineteenth book ad Sabinum) and Labeo, who concluded that the 
radix did not fall within the category of arbores. 
10
 Diliberto, La satira e il diritto cit., 399 and note 42. 
11
 Diliberto, La satira e il diritto cit., 400. 
12
 As previously stated, it is a criticism of the Stoics, for the purposes of which Horace uses clearly delineated legal 
figures in order to achieve greater concreteness. 
13
 See O. Vartzioti, Horace’s indigestible sense of humor (S. 1.3.63-8 & Epod. 3), in Academia.edu (= in 
Proceedings of the 9
th 
Latin Symposium: rideamus igitur, Athens 19-22/5/2011, Athens 2014, 100ff.). On the 
language of Horace’s satire see, finally, J.L. Ferriss-Hill, Roman Satire and the Old Comic Tradition, Cambridge 
2015, passim. 
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2. Qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit 
 
 
Let’s now move on to the second hypothesized offence mentioned by Horace: qui nocturnus 
sacra divum legerit. 
The poet considers he who – by night
14
– steals (legerit) sacred emblems (sacra) from the 
gods:
15
 he is referring exactly to sacrilegium,
16
 as has already been pointed out by Gnoli,
17
 who 
also notes that Nonius Marcellus should have considered this passage as well in relation to the 
term sacrilegium.
18
 However, Gnoli imply limited himself to specifying that Hor. sat. 1.3.117 
should be mentioned in relation to sacrilegium, saying nothing further about the significance of 
the verses themselves. 
The goal of this article is to highlight how, on close inspection, Horace’s text (which dates to 
a period preceding the lex Iulia peculatus et de sacrilegis
19
) seems to conjure up significant 






3. Sacrilege before the Augustan age. The state of learning and the sources 
 
 
                                                          
14
 More will be said about the nocturnal aspect of the sacrilege mentioned by Horace, which is extremely interesting 
and worthy of attention – in § 7 below. Here I will focus exclusively on the “generic” stealing of sacra. 
15
 For more about the etymology and linguistic ramifications of sacrilegium, understood as the “theft of sacred 
objects”, resulting, according to Latin lexicographers and antiquarians (see the definition of legere in Nonius 
Marcellus, 523. 33 L., where passages from earlier authors are also reported), from the union of sacrum and legere, 
and as a synonym of the corresponding Greek term (cf. sacrilegium, sacrilego, sacrilegus, in Corpus glossarium 
Latinorum, ed. Loewe-Goets, Leipzig 1901), see F. Gnoli, “‘Rem privatam de sacro surripere’”. Contributo allo 
studio della repressione del sacrilegium in diritto romano”, SDHI 40 (1974) 163ff.; Id., s.v. Sacrilegio, in EdD 41 
(1989) 213. 
16
 See Hor. carm 2.13.2: sacrilega manus (by extension ‘wicked’: epod. 3.1). 
17
 Fedeli, Q. Orazio Flacco. Le opere, II.2 cit., 377, has also observed that in the passage in question Horace is 
referring to sacrilege.  
18
 See Gnoli,‘Rem privatam de sacro surripere’ cit., 164, who affirms that Nonius Marcellus seems to have 
neglected precisely the citations more directly pertinent to the term sacrilegium: Hor. sat. 1.3.115-117, but also 
Rhet. ad Her. 2.30: maius esse maleficium stuprare ingenuam quam sacrum legere.  
19
 The Horatian source dates in fact to around 35 B.C. On the dating of Book I of the Satires, see Fedeli, Q. Orazio 
Flacco. Le Opere, II.2, cit., XI. On the lex Iulia de peculatu, see B. Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale nell’antica 
Roma², Milano 1998, 200f. and note 43. 
20
 These connotations, as will be seen, would perhaps imply a “reconsideration” of sacrilege before the Augustan 
legislation. 
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Above all, let’s examine the state of learning with respect to the configuration of sacrilege
21
 
before the Augustan legislation. 
Roman legal doctrine stressed the purely religious nature of the crime in antiquity, the 
prevailing notion being that it was an offence against the gods. Stealing sacred objects was thus 
regarded as a wicked act
22 
hat could not be tolerated by society.
23
 
It is no coincidence that one can find sources from the republican age that ascribe the 
punishment of death to those guilty of sacrilege, responsible for having provoked the ira deorum 
against the collective interest:
24
 the sources in question are Cic. leg. 2.9.22
25
 and Val. Max. 
1.1.13. 
Above all, Cicero – in the imaginary description of an ideal order – points out, in the cited 
passage, that a person who has stolen a sacred object or one housed in a sacred place should be 
considered on a par with a parricide: in fact, he declares sacrum sacrove commendatum clepsit 
raptisve, paricidas esto,
26
 where the expression paricidas esto refers to capital punishment, 
linked, as is well known, to the lex regia concerning deliberate homicide. 
Valerius Maximus (1.1.13) explains in fact that the poena cullei was inflicted by law on 
parricides, placing the offence against parents on the same level as that towards the gods: idque 
                                                          
21
 For literature on sacrilege, see E. Cuq, s.v. Sacrilegium, in DS 4/2 (1918) 980ff.; I. Pfaff, s.v. Sacrilegium, in RE 1 
A/2 (1920) 1678ff.; E. Benveniste, Sacrilegus, in Hommages Niedermann, Brussels 1956, 49ff.; L. Bove, ‘Subreptio 
di res privata depositata in aede sacra’, in Labeo 3 (1957) 357ff.; C. Gioffredi, s.v. Sacrilegium, in NNDI 16 
(1969), 311; F. Gnoli, Sulla paternità e sulla datazione della lex Iulia peculatus, in SDHI 38 (1972) 328ff.; Id., Sulla 
repressione della ritenzione di pecunia residua nella lex Iulia peculatus, in RIL 107 (1973) 437ff.; O. Robinson, 
Blasphemy and sacrilege in Roman law, in The Irish Jurist 8 (1973) 356ff.; Gnoli, s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 212ff.; Id., 
Rem privatam de sacro surripere cit., 163ff.; Id., Sen. Benef. 7.7.1-4: prospettiva filosofica e prospettiva giuridica 
del sacrilegium, in SDHI 40 (1974) 401ff.; Id., Ricerche sul crimen peculatus, Milan 1979, 2ff.; N. Zeddies, Religio 
e sacrilegium: Studien zur Inkriminierung von Magie, Häresie und Heidentum (4.-7. Jahrhundert), Frankfurt 2003, 
20ff. ; F. Santangelo, Whose Sacrilege? A Note on Sal. 5.14, in Classical World 104 (2011) 333ff. 
22
 P. Voci, Diritto sacro romano in età arcaica, in SDHI 19 (1953) 58f., includes sacrilege among those cases that 
are unexpiable, together with a: 1) verberatio parentis, 2) violation of boundaries, 3) the theft of fruges aratro 
quaesitae, 4) excesses in the exercising of marital authority, 5) misdeeds of married or single women, 6) fraus of the 
client by the patron, 7) the guilt of the vestal, 8) perjury, 9) offences envisaged by leges sacratae, 10) perduellio and 
parricidium, 11) offences impossible to reconstruct (if not through their punishment).  
23
 Society dealt with these instances by expelling or killing those responsible in order to win back divine 
benevolence towards the Roman people. Cf. Gnoli, s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 212; M. Torelli (et al.), Le dèlit religieux 
dans la cité antique, Rome 1981, passim. 
24
 Evidence that this was the punishment can, as Gnoli, s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 212 and note 6, shows, be found in 
ancient Greek law. 
25
 Sacrum sacrove commendatum qui clepsit rapsitve, parricida esto. 
26
 See G. Franciosi (ed.), Leges regiae, Naples 2003,113, who includes Cic. leg. 2.9.22 amongst the laws ascribed to 
Numa Pompilius in the sphere of criminal law. On the passage, see in particular S. Tondo, Leges regiae e paricidas, 
Florence 1973, 140ff., who stresses how in Cic. leg. 2.9.22 the term paricidas retains a clear and unambiguous 
reference to poena cullei, and explains the lex cited by Cicero on the basis of the treatment of sacrilege in the Greek 
world – evidencing the independence of the law in question with respect to Platonic models, drawn on by Cicero 
only as a model, such as genus orationis (142) – and in analogous precedents in the Roman world; for the passage 
under consideration, see, finally, L. Garofalo, Studi sulla sacertà, Padua 2005, 118, note 169. 
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supplicii (referring to poena cullei) genus multo post parricidis lege inrogatum est, iustissime 
quidem, quia pari vindicta parentum ac deorum violatio expianda est.
27
 
Both Cicero and Valerius Maximus thus employ the formula of paricidas esto in reference to 
the offending of the divinity, which seems to me not only to testify to the extreme seriousness of 
sacriligious behaviour but also that it intrinsically dated back over time. 
 
 
4. Analysis of passages evoking sacrilege 
 
 
As the term itself makes clear, sacrilegium involved the theft of sacred things. Legal learning 
simply affirmed in general terms that the protected object, even before the Augustan legislation,  
consisted of res divini iuris. 
In particular, it does not seem to me that any clarity has been achieved about the issue – of 
some importance, in my view –, of whether sacrilege prior to the lex Iulia peculatuset de 
sacrilegis
28
 also concerned res sanctae,
29
 in addition to res sacrae and religiosae, and whether 
the offence was restricted just to the theft thereof or if it extended to their violation.
30
 
In other words, the content of crimen sacrilegii in the age prior to the lex Iulia does not seem 
to have been explored. In view of this, it is worth considering some sources – which do not 
appear to have been previously examined with regard to sacrilege – that can, in some way, help 
to clarify and render more precise the issue in question. 
 
a) Let’s look, above all, at: 
 
                                                          
27
 See Franciosi, Leges regiae cit., 204. 
28
 For more about the lex Iulia peculatus et sacrilegis, of uncertain date (and, for some, of dubious attribution as well 
– cf. Gnoli, Sulla paternità e sulla datazione della Lex Iulia peculatus cit., passim), see, most recently, B. 
Santalucia, in Talamanca (ed.), Lineamenti di storia del Diritto Romano², Milan 1989, 454; Id., Diritto e processo 
penale cit., 200 and cited literature. The law established new norms against the stealing and misappropriation of 
money and public goods (embezzlement in the narrow sense), as well as against the theft of sacred and religious 
things (sacrilegium). 
29
 For E. Volterra, Istituzioni di diritto privato romano, Roma 1974, 277, the answer is affirmative. In truth, the 
author expressly sustains that the violation of res sanctae was considered sacrilegium and the culprit received the 
death penalty. What’s more, he points out that the act of climbing over the walls instead of going through the doors 
was hostile et abominandum (cf. D. 1.8.11, of Pomponius, who cites the killing of Remus by Romulus as an 
example of punishment for having climbed the walls). As regards the category of res sanctae, see, most recently, O. 
Licandro, In ius vocatio e violazione del domicilio, in SDHI 57 (1991) 208ff.; E. Tassi Scandone, Quodammodo 
divini iuris. Per una storia giuridica delle res sacrae, Naples 2013, 15ff. 
30
 See Gnoli, Rem privatam de sacro surripere cit., 172, who, explaining how, in the system of the quaestiones 
perpetuae, sacrilege was understood to be no longer “just theft of a res sacra or of a res religiosa”, leaves one to 
suppose that, before the system mentioned, the offence in question did not also include the stealing of res sanctae. 
Rather, the scholar examined the question of whether the appropriation of res private kept in a sacred place also 
constituted sacrilege. In the same vein, see also Bove, ‘Subretio di res privata’ cit., 357ff.; cf., in any case, Volterra, 
Istituzioni cit., 559, who, in his treatment of theft, explicitly affirms that the theft of res divini iuris was not possible, 
as in such a case it would be crimen sacrilegii. 
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Prop. el. 3.13. 49-52:  
Auro pulsa fides, auro venalia iura, 
aurum lex sequitur, mox sine lege pudor. 
Torrida sacrilegum testantur limina Brennum, 
dum petit intonsi Pythia regna dei. 
 
The passage must be situated in the context of the elegy,
31
 which offers a harsh criticism of 
avaritia, a theme dear to the poet (as it was to Horace) and also treated in elegies 5, 7 and 12. In 
order to emphasize the indulgence displayed in the observance of contemporary customs, 
Propertius employs the conventional opposition between the corrupt society of his own age and 
the uncontaminated nature of the archaic world. In the passage in question, the poet, in narrating 
that the greed for wealth destroys faith, corrupts the law and undermines decency, observes that 
Brenno, in his craving for money, committed sacrilege by burning the limina and coveting the 
riches of the gods. 
Propertius’ reference, explains Fedeli,
32
 is to C. Brenno, who committed sacrilege in 278 BC 
when he seized the wealth of the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi. 
The crime committed by Brenno, and described by Propertius, is two-fold. Not only did he 
seize the wealth of the sanctuary at Delphi, but he also set fire to the limina. This attests, on the 
one hand, to his having stolen res sacrae, clearly an instance of sacrilegium, and on the other to 
his having violated res sanctae (the limina). 
Now the fact that the poet speaks of sacrilege also in relation to the profanation of the limina 
and not just with regard to res sacrae – obviously falling under sacrilegium, as the very 
etymology of the term suggests – seems to me to be of some interest, especially if one considers 
that he talks of it in relation to an event that took place in the third century BC, that is, in an age 
fairly remote in time. 
In the light of Propertius’ source, it appears in fact that the violation of res sanctae was 
viewed as sacrilege even then, just like the theft of res sacrae.
33
 
But this is not all. A further aspect relating to the ‘boundaries’ of sacrilege should be stressed. 
In the light of the above passage, it seems to me that the punishable behaviour did not just 
concern the removal, and thus theft, of res divini iuris, but also their profanation. In other words, 
the term sacrilegium is not just limited to the notion evoked by the verb legere. It would appear 
to have a wider connotation, extending to include the more generic act of violating those very 
                                                          
31
 Book Three of the Elegies probably dates to 25-22 BC. On this point, see, most recently, M. Maniaci, Cronologia 
e bibliografia della letteratura latina, in Cavallo – Fedeli - Giardina, Lo spazio letterario di Roma antica, V, Rome 
1991, 73, who ascribes the work to 22 BC. 
32
 P. Fedeli (ed.), Properzio. Il libro terzo delle Elegie, Bari 1985; Id. (ed.), Poesia d’amore latina, Milano 2007, 54. 
33
 The date of the lex Iulia is not certain. It might date to around 25 BC, that is, to around the time of the publication 
of Book Three of the Elegies. One might therefore object that Propertius speaks of sacrilege in relation to res 
sanctae, as the lex Iulia probably (this too is not certain) contemplated a similar violation: perforare muros, as can 
be read in D. 48.13.13 (11), Ulp., 68 ad ed. However, it seems to me that Propertius’ reference is to be attributed to 
an earlier age, because the poet is referring to Brenno; so, in the description of a circumscribed episode dating to the 
third century BC, Propertius employs the word sacrilegum, offering confirmation, it seems to me, that the violation 
of res sanctae, just like the theft of res sacrae, constituted crimen sacrilegii in an earlier age. 
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same res. Confirmation for this comes from at least two other literary sources, also (as far as I 
know) unexamined by Roman legal scholarship on sacrilege, and which in my view are of 
considerable interest. The sources are Tib. 2.4.21-26 and Ov. met. 738-880. 
 
b) Let’s begin with  
 
Tib. el. 2.4.21-26: 
At mihi per caedem et facinus sunt dona paranda,  
ne iaceam clausam flebilis ante domum;  
aut rapiam suspensa sacris insignia fanis; 
sed Venus ante alios est violanda mihi:  
Illa malum facinus suadet dominamque rapacem  
Dat mihi; sacrilegas sentiat illa manus. 
 
The context of the passage is as follows:
34
 bound in chains by the god Cupid and by the 
greedy puella, Tibullus confesses the state of triste servitium into which he has fallen. The 
reneging of the Muses (v. 15-20) is the first sign of an inexorable metamorphosis that transforms 
the peaceable poet (of the other elegies) into a man prepared to profane sanctuaries and carry out 
any kind of wickedness in order to satisfy the avidity of the dominant rapax will. Indeed, he 
appropriates the votive tablets hanging in the sanctuaries (suspensa sacris insignia) and profanes 
the temple of Venus. Tibullus consequently declares himself to be sacriligious, using the 
expression manus sacrilegas (v. 26) in relation to the violations of the res sacrae. Now it is true 
that the expression manus sacrilega recurs on various occasions in literary sources,
35
 in the most 
varied situations, in order to generally denote ‘wicked hands’: the expression refers, then, to a 
generic situation of irreverence or cruelty towards the gods or men – which would seem to 
suggest that Tibullus’ use of sacrilegium (manus...sacrilegas) is likewise of a generic nature. But 
it is equally true that the situation described by the poet and depicted as a violation of res sacrae 
(the votive tablets and the temple of Venus) is such as to technically ‘justify’ the use of an 
allusive expression of this kind with regard to the crime of sacrilege. In Tibullus’ passage, 
bearing out what was observed earlier about the punishable act of crimen sacrilegii, reference is 
made both to the stealing of res sacrae (the votive tablets hanging in the sanctuaries) and to their 
violation (the profanation of the temple of Venus). This would seem to argue in favour of the 
thesis that sacrilege does not just concern the theft but also the profanation of res divini iuris.
36
 
But there is, as already mentioned, another source, from some years later, which further bears 
out what has been said. 
                                                          
34
 Book One of the Elegies was probably published in 28 BC. On this point, see Maniaci, Cronologia cit., 71.  
35
 Hor. carm. 2.13.2 (sacrilega manu). 
36
 Here too it is likely that sacrilege is being talked about before the lex Iulia peculatus et de sacrilegis, considering 
that the elegy was composed around 28 BC. But even if it was written at a later date – as others claim (cf. Fedeli, 
Poesia d’amore latina cit., 57, who ascribes the publication of Book One of the Elegies to 26 BC) – it seems to me 
more reasonable to argue that Tibullus was inspired – if we accept the suggestion that he really is evoking sacrilege 
in the passage in question – by legislation (and customs) preceding the lex Iulia (which, for some, as we have seen, 
is in any case ascribable to 25 BC).  
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c) Ov. met. 8.738-880 
 
The text narrates the episode involving the wicked and violent Erysichthon, who violated a 
sacred wood in Ceres, for which he was harshly punished by the gods: let’s look at just a few 
verses. 
 
vv. 741-742:  
ille (referring to Erysichthon) etiam Cereale nemus violasse securi  
dicitur et lucos ferro temerasse vetustos.  
 
vv. 751-766:  
non tamen idcirco ferrum Triopeius illa  
abstinuit famulosque iubet succidere sacrum  
robur et, ut iussos cunctari vidit, ab uno 
edidit haec rapta sceleratus verba securi:  
«Non dilecta deae solum, sed et ipsa licebit  
sit dea, iam tanget frondente cacumine terram.» 
dixit et, obliquos dum telum librat in ictus,  
contremuit gemitumque dedit Deoia quercus, 
et pariter frondes, pariter pallescere glandes  
coepere ac longi pallorem ducere rami. 
cuius ut in trunco fecit manus inpia vulnus,  
haud aliter fluxit discusso cortice sanguis, 
quam solet, ante aras ingens ubi victima taurus  
concidit, abrupta cruor e cervice profundi. 
obstipuere omnes, aliquisque ex omnibus audet  
deterrere nefas saevamque inhibere bipennem.  
 
vv. 814-820:  
Dicta Fames Cereris, quamvis contraria semper  
illius est operi, peragit per que aëra vento 
ad iussam delata domum est et protinus intrat  
sacrilegi thalamos altoque sopore solutum  
(noctis enim tempus) geminis amplectitur ulnis 
seque viro inspirat faucesque et pectus et ora  
adflat et in vacuis peragit ieiunia venis. 
 
vv. 875-880:  
vis tamen illa mali postquam consumpserat omnem 
materiam dederatque gravi nova pabula morbo, 
ipse suos artus lacero divellere morsu 
coepit et infelix minuendo corpus alebat.  
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Quid moror externis? etiam mihi saepe novandi est 
corporis, o iuvenis, numero finita potestas. 
 
The context is long and complex, but for the purposes of the present work just a few points 
relating to the verses cited here can be emphasized. 
In Ovid’s suggestive and detailed narrative, Erysichthon violates a sacred grove at Ceres (vv. 
741-742), where he cuts down a holy tree (v. 752-753). To punish him for this sacrilege (v. 817: 
sacrilegi – but see also v. 792, where Ovid speaks of sacrilegi scelerata), the goddess makes him 
suffer the pangs of an insatiable hunger (vv. 814-820), quickly leading him to consume all his 
wealth and resources. He even goes so far as to repeatedly sell his daughter Mestra as a slave, but 
as even this expedient proves insufficient, Erysichthon ends up devouring himself (vv. 879-880). 
In this context, one important aspect should be stressed. In the light of Ovid’s text,
37
 it 
appears that sacrilege was deemed to have been committed even where an oak tree sacred to the 
gods was cut down – an act severely punished by the goddess. 
From the text, then, an aspect of some importance emerges in relation to the content of the 
crimen in question, which confirms, as said, the literary sources that have already been 
considered. 
It appears, in fact, that sacrilege did not just involve the theft of res sacrae but also, more 
generally, their violation.
38
 This offers further confirmation that crimen sacrilegii comprised any 
violation or profanation of res divini iuris. 
Following this (necessarily brief) digression on the sources from Tibullus and Ovid – which, 
seem significant regarding the content of sacrilege – let’s return to Propertius’ text, in the light of 
which crimen sacrilegii would appear also to comprise the act of profaning the res sanctae; let’s 
return, then, specifically to the object of the sacrilege. 
At this point consideration must be given to a very well-known and interesting text. 
 
 
d) Dion Hal. 2.74.3 
 
 
Dion. Hal. 2.74.3: 
 
εἰ δέ τις ἀφανίσειεν ἢ μεταθείη τοὺς ὅρους, ἱερὸν ἐνομοθέτησεν εἶναι τοῦ θεοῦ τὸν τούτων τι 
διαπραξάμενον, ἵνα τῷ βουλομένῳ κτείνειν αὐτὸν ὡς ἱερόσυλον ἥ τε ἀσφάλεια καὶ τὸ καθαρῷ 
μιάσματος εἶναι προσῇ. 
 
 
                                                          
37
 Note that the Metamorphoses date to around AD 8, and in any case were certainly composed after the issuing of 
the lex Iulia. But it is worth highlighting the passage under examination for its congruity with the previously 
considered passages dealing with sacrilege. 
38
 The passage will also be examined later on, in relation to bidental. 
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Dionysius of Halicarnassus attributes to Numa the celebrated norm whereby any person who 
removed or shifted boundary stones was consecrated to the god.
39
 The text then goes on to state 
the following prescription: anyone who wished to kill the sacrilegious person could do so with 
impunity, and would be considered unstained despite the killing.
40
 
Roman legal scholarship does not appear to have considered the passage in question in 
relation to the study of sacrilege, but it deserves to be read closely. 
The text reported by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which preserves a trace of the law ascribed 
to Numa, acquires great importance in relation both to the object of the crimen itself, and – as we 
will see – to the punishment. But for now let’s look at the first point, that is, the object of the 
sacrilege in the light of Dion. Hal. 2.74.3.  
It seems to me that the violation committed by a person shifting or removing other people’s 
boundary stones is explicitly defined as sacrilege (ἱερόσυλον): so, on the basis of the lex regia 
under consideration, it would appear that the crime – violation of the boundary stones – could 
fall within the broader category of sacrilege. 
But for now the following point can be emphasized: it seems to me that Dion. Hal. 2.74.3 can 
be regarded as one of the texts able to confirm that, from the remotest age of Rome onwards, the 
object of sacrilege could also be res sanctae and not just res sacrae (and religiosae), as the term 
sacrilegium would on the other hand seem to imply.
41
 
This enables us to observe, in conclusion, that sacrilege probably comprised the various acts 
of those who did not just steal but, more in general, violated res divini iuris.  
 
 
5. The punishment envisaged for crimen sacrilegii 
 
 
Let’s move on now to the punishment envisaged for crimen sacrilegii. 
                                                          
39
 See also Fest. (s.v. Terminus, L. 368), FIRA I, 11: Termino sacra faciebant, quod in eius tutela fines agrorum esse 
putabant. Denique Numa Pompilius statuit, eum qui terminum exarasset et ipsum et boves sacros esse, about which, 
see, most recently, Tassi Scandone, Quodammodo divini iuris cit., 142 note 72, and the bibliographic references 
cited therein. 
40
 Franciosi, Leges regiae cit., 113. On Dionysius’ text, now see M. Vinci, Fines regere. Il regolamento dei confini 
dall’età arcaica a Giustiniano, 185 and 230 (with earlier literature) and, more recently, Tassi Scandone, 
Quodammodo divini iuris cit., 142f. and note 72. 
41
 This makes sense, considering that the Romans themselves, in a more distant age, probably did not distinguish 
clearly between res sacrae, sanctae and religiosae and that the object damaged in crimen sacrilegii might therefore 
belong indistinctly to the different categories of res. But the issue of the distinction of res divini iuris is an old and 
complex one, and is not part of the aims of this essay. See, however, Volterra, Istituzioni cit., 277, who, in his 
treatment of res sanctae, observes that in the age of Gaius, Ulpian and Marcianus the original foundation of the 
juridical classification of res themselves was not clear: it was only from the II-III century AD that they came to 
denote the walls and gates of the city (and the boundaries), the violation of which was considered sacrilegium and 
punishable by death. 
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 has shown how, in the republican age,
43
 death was the punishment 
reserved for those who committed sacrilege. This conclusion is based in particular on two 
sources, which have already been considered: Cic. leg. 2.9.22 and Val Max. 1.1.13.
44
 
However, in relation to the punishment laid down for sacrilege, it would seem to me to be 
appropriate to also consider the celebrated law on the violation of boundaries reported by 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus and attributed to Numa.
45
 
In truth, the law expressly affirms the following: anyone taking away or moving boundary 
stones was to be consecrated to the god, insofar as such a person was sacrilegious (ἱερόσυλον): 
the transposition in Greek is technical. As Gnoli has already pointed out,
46
 the lemmas sacrilegus 
and sacrilegium correspond to the respective Greek terms, consisting analogously of the lemmas 
ἱερό (sacred things) and συλ (to sack). 
Considering, then, that the law refers precisely to sacrilege in the Latin sense of the term, it 
seems to me that it clearly equates the violation of boundaries to the theft of res sacrae, thus 
envisaging, in both cases, consecration to the gods. 
In conclusion, Dionysius seems to want to say that Numa did not just establish a norm to 
punish anyone who took away or moved the boundary stones, but likewise ruled that such a 
violation was to be punished by consecration to the gods. Read in these terms, then, the norm 
would, in my view, appear to hold crucial implications with regard to the punishment envisaged 
for crimen sacrilegii, as one might hypothesize the same crimen as the offence provided for in 
the lex regia in question, punished by being made sacer or at any rate with the violator being put 





6. The performance of sacrilege at night 
 
 
Finally, let’s examine the nocturnal dimension of Hor. sat. 1.3.117 The poet talks – it is 
worth repeating – of sacrilege taking place at night (nocturnus). 
                                                          
42
 See Voci, Diritto sacro romano cit., 59 note 72; Gioffredi, s.v. Sacrilegium cit., 311; Gnoli, s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 
212 note 5. 
43
 For the most ancient period, learning talks in general terms of repression of a sacred nature, involving religious 
expiation: see Liv. 29.19 ff. and 42.3. Cf. Gioffredi, s.v. Sacrilegium cit., 311. 
44
 To these sources Gnoli (s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 212 note 5) also adds Sen. benef. 7.7.2: quisquis id, quod deorum est, 
sustulit et consumpsit atque in usum suum vertit, sacrilegus est. On this passage, see Id., Sen. Benef. 7.7.1-4 cit., 
401ff. 
45
 See above, § 4.d. 
46
 See Gnoli, s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 213; ID., Rem privatam cit., 164, where – as has been said – the scholar limits 
himself to mentioning the Horatian source regarding the theft of res sacrae by night (sat. 1.3.115-117), without 
making any further observations.  
47
 It seems to me, then, that permitting anyone to perform the killing postulates that the punishment for sacrilege was 
to render the responsible party sacer: but this is obviously not the place to tackle such a theme. For more about 
sacertas, see L. Peppe, Note minime di metodo intorno alla nozione di homo sacer in SDHI 73 (2007) 429ff. 
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On the basis of P.S. 5.19 (De sacrilegis)
48
 and Ulp., D. 48.13.7 (6),
49
 it has been judged by 
scholarship that, as regards crimen sacrilegii, the aggravating circumstance of the moment in 
which the crime is carried out was only introduced in the imperial age.
50
 
Now it might just be an appealing idea, but it seems to me that what emerges in the passage 
in Horace is that the aggravated offence of sacrilegium, namely the theft of res sacrae or 
religiosae during the night, was already contemplated in the period in which the poet wrote the 
first book of Satires, around 35 BC – and therefore before the lex Iulia (which incorporated 
sacrilegium into crimen peculatus) and the subsequent imperial age (which, furthermore, greatly 
extended the boundaries of crimen itself). As already said, this is at odds with the view held in 
Roman legal studies that it dates to the imperial age. 
Basically, as is known, the different nature of an offence committed at night is attested from 
as early as the Twelve Tables, in relation to what is clearly a less serious crime than sacrilege: 
furtum. 
Horace might therefore also have wished to stress the more serious of the crimes, including 
the aggravating circumstance of it being carried out during the night, to further emphasize the 
difference from a person who, quite simply, took cabbages from someone else’s field.  
 
 
7. Sat. 1.3.115-117: conclusions 
 
 
Some concluding remarks can now be made.  
In sat. 1.3.117 Horace evokes a specific criminal offence, crimen sacrilegii, which, in the 
light of what has already emerged, seems to hold interesting legal implications that have not been 
considered to date in Roman legal studies and which, by contrast, I have tried to stress here. 
Sacrilege does not appear to me to simply constitute the theft of res sacrae but the violation, 
more in general, of res divini iuris, punished, in the most ancient age, by being made sacer and 
perhaps already envisaged also in the aggravating circumstance of sacrilege committed by night. 
The use of such an offence seems to me to play a functional role in the poetic discourse. In 
sat. 1.3.115-117 the poet examines two specific and completely different legal offences, 
comparing them in order to stress the paradoxical nature of the argument that the offences should 
be considered on the same plane. Horace clearly takes an entirely different view, and in this 
context, the circumstance that the second offence – sacrilege – is mentioned in its most 
aggravated form seems to me to be significant. 
 
                                                          
48
 Qui noctu manu facta praedandi ac depopulandi gratia templum inrumpunt, bestiis obiciuntur: si vero per diem 
leve aliquid de templo abstulerint, vel deportantur honestiores vel humiliores in metallum damnantur. 
49
 Sacrilegii poenam debebit proconsul pro qualitate personae proque rei condicione et temporis et aetatis et sexus 
vel severius vel clementius statuere. Et scio multos et ad bestias damnasse sacrilegos, nonnullos etiam vivos 
exussisse, alios vero in furca suspendisse. Sed moderanda poena est usque ad bestiarum damnationem eorum, qui 
manu facta templum effregerunt et dona dei in noctu tulerunt. Ceterum si qui interdiu modicum aliquid de templo 
tulit, poena metalli coercendus est, aut, si honestiore loco natus sit, deportandus in insulam est. 
50
 See Gnoli, s.v. Sacrilegio cit., 215. 
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8. The context of ars 470-472 
 
 
Now let’s consider: 
 
ars 470-472: 
Nec satis apparet, cur versus factitet: utrum  
minxerit in patrios cineres, an triste bidental  
moverit incestus. 
 
The context of the passage is as follows: Horace says he is unable to understand why a 
delirious poet (vesanum v. 455), wishing for a spectacular death (v. 479), continues to write 
verse. He suggests two possible reasons: the poet might have urinated on his father’s ashes 
(violating his father’s tomb) or moved a bidental (violating a sacred place). Certainly, Horace 
explains, he goes mad: just as a bear that breaks the bars of its cage sends onlookers running, so 
too the poet causes a general stampede by reading out his verses (v. 472-474). 
The poet cites two offences that evidently are highly deplorable in Roman society – 
offending one’s father and offending the gods – with the god punishing both by making the 
perpetrator mad. It is no accident, as will be seen, that madness was regarded as an appropriate 
divine punishment for serious misdeeds. 
Around the passage under consideration, which touches, as we have seen, respectively on the 
father-son relationship and the one between deities and human beings, it is interesting to note a 
number of strands at play in the sphere between ius sacrum and ius civile.  
   
 
9. The profanation of the father’s ashes 
 
 
As regards the violation of the father’s ashes (minxerit in patrios cineres),
51
 it is worth 
focusing in general terms on the sacredness of ashes. 
In the ancient world ashes (of the father and/or mother) – an object of cult and a symbol of 
the ancestral tomb – were for the most part evoked when swearing oaths and for glorifications. 
But ashes could likewise be understood as being associated with res religiosae, that is, with 
things dedicated to the Manes (Gai. 2.4: ...religiosae, quae diis Manibus relictae sunt). 
Volterra, in fact, in his treatment of res religiosae, clearly shows how a piece of land could 
become religious, and therefore extra commercium, without the need for any formality, but 
                                                          
51
 C. O. Brink, Horace on poetry. The Ars Poetica, Cambridge 1971, 429, talks of the violation of graves and 
sustains that the sense of the passage accomodates an occasional lowering of verbal propriety, and likewise Pers. 
1.113-114 pueri, sacer est locus, extra / miite and Iuv. 1.131 cuius ad effigiem non tantum meiiere fas est. Fedeli, Q. 
Orazio Flacco. Le opere, II.4 cit., 1611, in relation to vv. 470-471, speaks of “crimes that are horrendous because 
they have sacrilege in common”. In particular, he notes that the expression minxerit in patrios cineres refers to the 
crime of profaning one’s father’s tomb.  
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simply if the rightful owner buried a human body or the ashes (obviously following the 
burning
52
 of the corpse)
53
 on the land: in antiquity it can thus be supposed that the burial of a 









And so we have: 
 
Prop. 2.20.15-16:  
Ossa tibi iuro per matris et ossa parentis 
(si fallo, cinis heu sit mihi uterque gravis!) 
me tibi ad extremas mansurum, vita, tenebras. 
 
Here the poet vows eternal love towards Cinzia, swearing on the bones of his mother, his 
father and their ashes. 
 
Hor. carm. 2.8.9-10:  





                                                          
52
 Cf. tab. 10.1 = FIRA I, 66; M.H. Crawford, Roman Statutes (BICS. Supplement) II, London 1996, 704. 
53
 VOLTERRA, Istituzioni cit., 275. 
54
 See Ps. Quint. Decl. maiores 5. 6: Hinc et ille venit affectus, quod ignotis cadaveribus humum <in>gerimus, et 
insepultum quodlibet corpus nulla festinatio tam rapida transcurrit, ut non quantu locumque veneretur aggestu; 
Hor. carm. 1. 28.23-25: At tu, nauta, vagae ne parce malignus harenae / ossibus et capiti inhumato / particulam 
dare; Petr. sat. 114.11: si nihil aliud, certe divtius» inquit «iunctos nos mare feret, vel si voluerit misericors ad idem 
litus expellere, aut praeteriens aliquis tralaticia humanitate lapidabit, aut quod ultimum est iratis etiam fluctibus, 
imprudens harena componet. Cf. also Plaut. most. 500-504: Deceptus sum: hospes hic me necavit, isque me / 
Defodit insepultum clam [ibidem] in hisce aedibus, / Scelestus, auri causa. / Nunc tu hinc emigra: / Scelestae hae 
sunt aedes, impiast habitatio. Interment seems to have been completed by a series of liturgical rites regulated by the 
pontiffs (Cic. leg. 2.55: Iam tanta religio est sepulchrum, ut extra sacra et gentem inferri fas negent esse). With time 
the particular features of places that could not become religious despite interment were delineated. The regulation of 
the funeral rites by pontifical law was meticulous in so far as deorum Manium iura sancta sunto (Cic. leg. 2.22), and 
it was precisely such law that had to preserve the sanctity of burials. 
55
 As regards the father’s ashes, see also Verg. Aen. 4.427: nec patris Anchisae cinerem Manesve revelli, where Dido 
says she has not violated the ashes and the Manes of Aeneas’ father Anchises. The passage can be linked in some 
way (as least with respect to the repetition of the terms) to v. 34 of the same book, where Anna, after having told her 
sister not to feel guilty about having fallen in love with another person (v. 19, where Dido talks of sin: culpa for the 
betrayal of fides maritalis), asks her (rhetorically, it seems to me): id cinerem aut Manis credis curare sepultos? 
56
 Cf. Nisbet - Hubbard (eds.), A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book II cit., 128, who, in reference to Horace’s 
oath on the mother’s ashes, state that “a man would have sworn by his father’s ashes (Propertius – 2.20.15 – is 
eccentric to mention both parents); a courtesan naturally concentrates on her mother, who may be the only parent 
she knows”. E. Romano, Q. Orazio Flacco, Le opere: Le odi, Il Carme secolare, Gli Epodi, I.2, 664, highlights that 
fallere is a sacral-juridical technicality (cf. the formula si sciens fallo) indicating the violation of an oath, and refers 
to Liv. 2.45.13 and Verg. Aen. 6.324. 
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 the poet observes that it is even worth it for her to mock the buried 




Sen. Rhet. contr. 7 praef. 7:  
«Placet», inquit, «tibi rem iureiurando transigi? Iura, sed ego ius iurandum mandabo: iura 
per patris cineres, qui inconditi sunt, iura per patris memoriam» 
 
Here the author, in a hearing before the centumviral court, has Albuzio ask to solemnly swear 
– to Arruntius – on the ashes of his father (which he has left unburied), that is, on the memory of 
him. 
In the passages considered it is clear that ashes are viewed as an object and symbol worthy of 
deference and respect; as we have seen, in Propertius they represent the most significant way of 
swearing love for one’s beloved; ashes are evoked in Horace in order to emphasize the offensive 
attitude of Barine; finally, in Seneca, they are even brought up in the context of legal 
proceedings, as the object of an oath. 
Now let’s look at some places where ashes are glorified. Consider: 
 
Verg. Aen. 5.77-81:  
Hic duo rite mero libans carchesia Baccho 
fundit humi, duo lacte novo, duo sanguine sacro, 
purpureosque iacit flores ac talia fatur: 
«Salve, sancte parens; iterum salvete, recepti 
nequiquam cineres animaeque umbraeque paternae! 
 
The passage refers to a solemn ceremony in which the ashes, shadow and soul of Anchises are 
evoked. 
The context of the passage is of some interest. Aeneas reaches Sicily, where his father is 
buried, on the anniversary of his death. Before his assembled men, he announces a sacrifice in 
honour of Anchises and exclaims “hail, holy father, once again; hail ashes, rescued though in 
vain, and you soul and shade of my sire!”
58
 (v. 80-81). A prodigium then occurs:
59
 during 
Aeneas’ commemorative speech, a snake slithers under the altar (v. 85-87): this is a sign of the 
presence of Anchises. At this point the funerary honours were renewed with increased vigour (v. 
94): Aeneas killed, according to ritual, two sheep (caedit binas de more bidentis v. 96). The rites 
concluded. 
                                                          
57
 ROMANO (Q. Orazio Flacco, Le opere, I.2 cit., 663) stresses that the ode centres entirely on Barine and her 
perjury. Note, moreover, that legal terms are also evoked here: cf. vv. 5-6 obligasti...votis caput. 
58
 Virgil, Eclogues, Georgics, Aeneid, translated by H. R. Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library, volumes 63 and 64, 
Cambridge (MA), 1916.  
59
 This should be noted above all for the subsequent discussion of the bidental. 
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The verses confirm, on the one hand, that the ashes of Aeneas’ father were honoured with 
solemn ceremonial rites, and, furthermore, that an attitude of devotion and respect was due to 
them.  
Clearly such an attitude is far removed from the one demonstrated in the episode narrated in 
ars 471 by Horace, who has the vesanus urinate on his father’s ashes: the situation is 
paradoxical. The poet describes a scene in which not only is the figure of the father offended – 
and this, as has been seen on numerous occasions, constituted a very serious violation and was 
one of the most frequently recurrent topoi in literary and rhetorical circles – but use is also made 
of ashes, on which a wicked action is carried out, to indicate the profanation of something that 
can be associated with burial. In ars 471, then, there appears to be a dual violation: of the father 
and of the gods, granted that res religiosae were, as we know, those dedicated to chthonic 
deities. 
Horace, without specifying the offence committed by the person who became vesanus (unlike 
in sat. 117, specific reference is made to sacrilege – sacra divum legerit), leaves it up to the 
reader to interpret the passage in question. It does not seem possible in this instance to identify a 
specific individual offence, but I believe it could cover the different possibilities outlined above. 
 
 
10. The violation of the bidental 
 
 
Let’s move on now to the case of someone who triste bidental / moverit (ars 471-472), that 
is, a person who moved – thereby violating – a bidental (ars 471-472). 
Above all, it seems opportune to try to establish the exact legal-religious nature of bidental, 
understood as the place in which someone has been struck or killed by lightning.
60
 It is worth 
observing that a lightning strike was regarded as the omen of iniquitous events. In such cases, a 
council of ten priests, known as bidentales, gathered together what had been burnt, together with 
the grass torn up by the strike,
61
 and oversaw the enclosing of the affected point and the burial of 
a stone as a symbolic representation of the lightning strike itself. This was followed by the 
sacrifice of a sheep qui duos habet dentes (bidens),
62
 hostia, which gave the name to the place, 
                                                          
60
 Fest. s.v. Fulguritum, 82 L.: Fulguritum, id quod est fulmine ictum, qui locus statim fieri putabatur religiosus, 
quod eum deus sibi dicasse videretur; Varr. l. Lat. 5.10.13: fulguritum quod fulmine ictum.   
61
Cf. Lucan. bell. 1.605-608: dumque illi effusam longis anfractibus urbem / circumeunt Arruns dispersos fulminis 
ignis / colligit et terrae maesto cum murmure condit / datque locis numen; sacris tunc admovet aris / electa cervice 
marem. 
62
 Cf. A. Forcellini, Lexicon Totius Latinitatis, s.v. Bidens (I, 447), understood here as qui duos habet dentes; Fest. 
s.v. Bidental 30 L.: bidental dicebant quoddam templum, quod in eo bidentibus hostiis sacrificaretur. Bidentes 
autem sunt oves duos dentes longiores ceteris habentes: in this passage it is clear that the bidental was the place in 
which the oves bidentes were sacrificed (the same sense can be seen in Pers. sat. 2.26-27: An quia non fibris ovium 
Ergennaque iubente / Triste iaces lucis evitandumque bidental).  
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the sacrifices and the priests. The area was enclosed within a circular wall,
63
 and it was forbidden 
to enter, touch or look at it.
64
 
Now the point to stress here is that the bidental – as Albanese shows
65
 –  was considered a 
res religiosa,
66
 that is, something offered to the Manes, and therefore in some way assimilated to 
ashes, in turn associated – as has been said – precisely to res religiosae. Such a likeness is of 
considerable interest: Horace would seem to have brought together two similar offences, in order 
to emphasize that both in the case of a profanation of the father’s ashes, and in that of the 
violation of a bidental (triste)
67
 – both considered offensive to the gods – a very serious form of 
divine punishment was envisaged: madness. 
But before moving on to the conclusions, a final point needs to be made about ars 470ff., 
which supports the description of the bidental (or of both offences) as a res religiosa.  
 
 
11. On the use of incestus 
 
 
Let’s once again examine 
ars 471-472:  
minxerit in patrios cineres an triste bidental 
moverit incestus.  
 
                                                          
63
 Cf. Varr. l. Lat. 5.32.10: Cornelius et Lutatius scribunt eum locum esse fulguritum et ex S. C. septum esse: id quod 
factum esset a Curtio consule, cui M. Genucius fuit collega, Curtium appellatum. 
64
 Pers. sat. 2.26-28: An quia non fibris ovium Ergennaque iubente / Triste iaces lucis evitandumque bidental, / 
Idcirco stolidam praebet tibi vellere barbam / Iuppiter?; Ammian. rer. gest. 23.5.12-13: 12 Secuto itidem die, qui 
erat septimum idus Aprilis, sole vergente iam in occasum ex parva nubecula subito aere crassato usus adimitur 
lucis, et post minacem tonitruum crebritatem et fulgorum Iovianus nomine miles de caelo tactus cum duobus equis 
concidit, quos potu satiatos a flumine reducebat. 13 Eoque viso harum rerum interpretes arcessiti interrogatique 
etiam id vetare procinctum fidentius adfirmabant fulmen consiliarium esse monstrantes: ita enim appellantur quae 
dissuadent aliquid fieri vel suadent ideoque hoc nimis cavendum, quod militem celsi nominis cum bellatoriis 
iumentis extinxit, et hoc modo contacta loca nec intueri nec calcari debere fulgurales pronuntiant libri. 
65
 B. Albanese, “Bidental, Mundus, Ostium, Orci” nella categoria delle res relisiosae, in Ius 20(1969) 226.  
66
 As has been seen, the sources state that a place struck by lightning was considered religiosus (Fest. s.v. 
Fulguritum, 82 L.: Fulguritum, id quod est fulmine ictum, qui locus statim fieri putabatur religiosus, quod eum deus 
sibi dicasse videretur), a term with various meanings (Gell. noct. Att. 4, 9; Fest. s.v. Religiosus, 348-350 L.); given 
the prohibitions associated with the bidental, here religiosus points to a human action against divine will (Fest. s.v. 
Religiosus, 350 L.: Idem religiosum quoque esse, +qui non iam+ sit aliquid, quod ibi homini facere non liceat; quod 
si faciat, adversus deorum voluntatem videatur facere), expressed by sending a lightning strike onto the earth.  
67
 With regards to triste bidental see also Pers. sat. 2.26-27, which has already been discussed, where it emerges that 
the bidental was viewed as an inauspicious place, to be avoided. Note, as Fedeli observes (at ars 471 in Q. Orazio 
Flacco. Le Opere, II.4 cit., 1612), that the bidental was called triste either because the lightning expressed the wrath 
of the gods, or because the place instilled terror. On the correspondence between the passage in Persius and the one 
by Horace under consideration, see ALBANESE, “Bidental, Mundus, Ostium” cit., 226. 
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Incestus is the term used by Horace in relation to the profanation of the bidental. But by way 
of symmetry it could also refer to the first offence described by the poet, namely the profanation 
of the father’s ashes. 
Let’s look briefly at the lemma in question. The principal meaning of incestus is that which 
does not conform to the rules or rites relating to religio; furthermore, it denotes that which is 
incestuous, culpable and criminal.
68
 
Horace’s use of the term with regard to the offence in question (or to both of the offences 
mentioned) seems to further underline the religious nature of the bidental (and of the ashes 
understood as burial). If this were so, it would once again lend weight to the hypothesis that 
Horace placed the two crimes (the profanation of the father’s ashes and the violation of a 
bidental) on the same plane: extremely serious, offensive to the gods and therefore associable to 
a certain extent with sacrilege – understood (in the most ancient times), as has been seen, as the 
general violation of res divini iuris – and, in any case, with offences lying between ius sacrum 
and ius civile.  
 
 
12. Ars 470-472: a final observation 
 
 
A final observation may be made before concluding.  
In ars 450ff. Horace emphasizes that profanation of the father’s ashes, and likewise the 
violation of a bidental, represent the possible causes of the madness of the poet described in the 
verses in question. 
He thus draws on a topos present in the ancient tradition, in addition to the literature of the 
time: that madness could be seen as a kind of divine punishment inflicted on the culpable party 
for having committed the violations described.
69
 In truth, it was held that not only did the Furiae 
not leave serious misdeeds unpunished (above all towards one’s parents), but that they could also 
take possession of people in order to induce them to commit a crime. 
It is no accident that in vv. 475ff. of Horace’s text the mad poet is likened to a wild beast: 
having captured his prey, he holds it tight, preventing it from escaping, until the prey dies from 
reading his verse (occidit...legendo), thereby himself committing a crimen. 
As Diliberto explains – albeit in an entirely different context – the possession by the Furiae 
of someone culpable of wicked deeds could, on the one hand, be the consequence of a crime, and 
on the other, could even be the cause.
70
 
In these terms, the condition of someone committing iniquitous acts was thus assimilated to 
that of the furiosus: a pairing that was certainly already traditional in the Roman culture of the 
first century BC. 
                                                          
68
 See A. Ernout - A. Meillet, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue latine. Histoire des mots³, Paris 1979, 104.  
69
 O. Diliberto, Il testamento del matricida, in Studi economico-giuridici dell’Univ. di Cagliari 52 (1988) 189.  
70
 Diliberto, Il testamento del matricida cit., 188. Diliberto also points out (185ff.) what the response of the Furies 
was to the murder of a parent, analysing in particular Cic. Rosc. Amer. 24.66-68 and Cic. Tusc. 3.5.11. Finally, he 
shows how the literary-mythical image of Orestes pursued by the Furiae (see Serv. Aen. 4.473) was already 
widespread in Rome at the end of the third century BC.  
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Horace, therefore, seems to have exploited the rhetorical and literary topos, which – as has 
been said – was designed to associate the figure of someone who carries out wicked acts with 
that of the furiosus, as a consequence (or cause) of his actions, in order to emphasize the 
seriousness of the two deeds described. The violation of the father’s ashes and the profanation of 
the bidental are presented, then, as acts against religio. Triggering the wrath of the gods, they 
were punished by the infliction of madness (above all on those who committed an outrage on 
their parents – parricide, for instance) on the person responsible for them. This argues in favour 
of considering such behaviours as juridical offences, lying between ius sacrum and ius civile, and 




Abstract. - In sat. 1.3. Horace discusses the theme of whether the law should be applied in a 
rigid, undifferentiated way – irrespective of the scale, motive and context of the offence – or 
whether culpability should be evaluated case by case, considering the real gravity of the deed, on 
the basis of reason, good sense and social utility. He concludes that distinctions must be made 
between human wrongdoings, a view at odds with the line taken by the Stoics, who admitted no 
differentiation between misdeeds, applying the same identical severity to them all. Using a quite 
unambiguous example, Horace makes it clear that reason will never prove that the sin is one and 
the same to cut young cabbages in a neighbour’s garden and to steal by night the sacred emblems 
of the gods: the difference between the two acts is glaring, and is specifically intended, in 
Horace’s argument, to underline that not all deplorable actions should be punished to the same 
degree. The article explores how Horace in sat. 1.3115-117 (which dates to a period preceding 
the lex Iulia peculatus et de sacrilegis) seems to conjure up significant connotations regarding 
crimen sacrilegii, also in the light of other literary sources that are likewise considered. The 
research draws out certain legal implications of crimen sacrilegii that have not been considered 
to date in Roman legal studies, showing that sacrilege does not appear to simply constitute the 
theft of res sacrae but the violation, more in general, of res divini iuris, punished, in the most 
ancient age, by being made sacer. 
Elsewhere in Horace (ars 470-472), violation of the father’s ashes and the profanation of the 
bidental are presented as acts against religio. Triggering the wrath of the gods, they were 
punished by the infliction of madness on the person responsible for them. As the article shows, 
this argues in favour of considering such behaviours as juridical offences, lying between ius 
sacrum and ius civile, and ascribable to the sphere of sacrilege. 
 
In sat. 1.3 Orazio discute del tema se la legge debba essere applicata in modo rigido e 
indifferenziato – indipendentemente dall’entità, dal movente e dal contesto dell’illecito compiuto 
– oppure se la colpa debba essere valutata caso per caso, considerando la reale gravità della 
trasgressione commessa, sulla base della ragione, del buon senso e della stessa utilità sociale. 
Egli conclude che le colpe commesse dagli uomini devono essere distinte fra loro, in 
contrapposizione con quanto ritenuto dagli Stoici, i quali non ammettevano alcuna 
differenziazione tra esse, applicando a tutte identica severità. Utilizzando una esemplificazione 
che non lascia adito ad equivoci, Orazio chiarisce quindi come nessun ragionamento possa 
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equiparare i reati di chi nell’orto altrui abbia fatto a pezzi cavoli ancora teneri e chi nottetempo 
abbia saccheggiato oggetti sacri degli dei: la differenza tra le due azioni è clamorosa ed è 
finalizzata, nell’ambito dell’argomentazione oraziana, proprio a sottolineare che non tutte le 
azioni riprovevoli sono da punire nella medesima misura. L'articolo spiega come il testo di 
Orazio sat. 1.3.115-117 (che risale a un periodo precedente la lex Iulia peculatus et de 
sacrilegis), sembri evocare significative suggestioni in tema di crimen sacrilegii, anche sulla 
scorta di ulteriori fonti letterarie esaminate. La ricerca evidenzia altresì come Orazio rievochi una 
precisa fattispecie giuridica, rappresentata dal sacrilegio, che mostra interessanti profili sinora 
non presi in considerazione dalla romanistica, rilevando che tale crimen non sembra costituire 
semplicemente la sottrazione di res sacrae ma, più in generale, la violazione di res divini iuris, 
punita, nella età più antica, con la sacertà. 
Altrove, in Orazio (ars 470-472), la violazione delle ceneri paterne e la profanazione del 
bidental vengono presentate come atti contrari alla religio, scatenanti l’ira degli dei e puniti con 
la pazzia nei confronti del responsabile. Come evidenzia questo contributo, ciò induce ad 
includere detti comportamenti nell’ambito del sacrilegio, crimen a cavallo fra ius sacrum e ius 
civile. 
 
